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Abstract
We propose a novel defense against all existing gradient based adversarial attacks
on deep neural networks for image classification problems. Our defense is based on
a combination of deep neural networks and simple image transformations. While
straightforward in implementation, this defense yields a unique security property
which we term buffer zones. We argue that our defense based on buffer zones offers
significant improvements over state-of-the-art defenses. We are able to achieve this
improvement even when the adversary has access to the entire original training
data set and unlimited query access to the defense. We verify our claim through
experimentation using Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10: We demonstrate < 11%
attack success rate – significantly lower than what other well-known state-of-the-art
defenses offer – at only a price of a 11− 18% drop in clean accuracy. By using a
new intuitive metric, we explain why this trade-off offers a significant improvement
over prior work.
1 Introduction
There are many applications based on Convolution Neural Networks (CNNs) such as image classifica-
tion Krizhevsky et al. [2012], Simonyan and Zisserman [2015], object detection Girshick [2015], Ren
et al. [2015], semantic segmentation Shelhamer et al. [2017] and visual concept discovery Wang et al.
[2017]. However, it is well-known that CNNs are highly susceptible to small perturbations η which
are added to benign input images x. As shown in Szegedy et al. [2013], Goodfellow et al. [2014],
by adding visually imperceptible perturbations to the original image, adversarial examples x′ can be
created, i.e., x′ = x+ η. These adversarial examples are misclassified by the CNN with high confi-
dence. Hence, making CNNs secure against this type of attack is a significantly important task. In the
literature, adversarial machine learning attacks can be categorized as either white-box or black-box.
This categorization depends on how much information about the classifier is necessary to run the
attack. Due to the challenging nature of designing defenses against white-box attacks Tramer et al.
[2020], Athalye et al. [2018a], Carlini and Wagner [2017a], the classifier parameters are kept/assumed
secret in this paper. This disallows white-box attacks and so we focus exclusively on black-box
adversaries. This setup is common, for example online machine learning services by default only
allow black-box access to their models and do not publish their model parameters Papernot et al.
[2017].
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Figure 1: CIFAR-10 defenses with clean accuracy pd (Clean Accuracy) and δ value (Delta) for
untargeted black-box attacks. Acronyms for the various defenses are given in Section 5.
Figure 2: Decision regions with and without buffer zones ⊥.
Defense performance metrics. Many defenses have been proposed in the literature to counter
adversarial machine learning. Some popular recent defenses include Papernot et al. [2016a], Kurakin
et al. [2016], Tramèr et al. [2017], Cao and Gong [2017], Metzen et al. [2017], Feinman et al. [2017],
Xie et al. [2018], Meng and Chen [2017], Guo et al. [2017], Srisakaokul et al. [2018]. To properly
analyze a defense two important factors must be considered. First, what is the attack success rate
on the defense? Second, what kind of drop in clean accuracy is required to achieve the defense? To
properly evaluate adversarial defenses, we explain in section 3 a new metric δ which encapsulates
both pieces of information: δ is defined as δ = γ+(p−γ)α, where the original clean accuracy (of the
vanilla scheme without defense) is denoted as p, the drop in clean accuracy caused by implementing
the defense is denoted as γ and the attack success rate is denoted as α. The new clean accuracy of the
defense (without attack) is pd = p− γ. In section 3 we show that the accuracy of the defense in the
presence of adversaries is equal to p− δ. In Figure 1 we show the δ vs clean accuracy pd for various
ResNet defenses against untargeted black-box attacks for the CIFAR10 data set in the literature as
well as our own proposed BUZz defenses.
It is important to note that our defense not only achieves the lowest δ, but also the various BUZz
configurations offer different possible trade-offs between a higher clean prediction accuracy pd or a
smaller δ. An important lesson from Tramer et al. [2020], Athalye et al. [2018a], Carlini and Wagner
[2017a] is that it seems not possible to gain security (a small δ implied by a high defender success
rate 1− α) with high clean accuracy (pd), in other words, there must be a trade-off. BUZz is the first
method which can allow the user to tune security andclean prediction accuracy.
Buffer zone based defense. Our defense is based on a novel concept which we term “buffer zones”.
Buffer zones are regions in between classes with a special label. If an input image falls into this
buffer zone region, the classifier returns a null label (i.e. the image is recognized as adversarial). In
order for an adversary to create an image that defeats the defense, they must add a large perturbation
to the input image. However, as mentioned in Papernot et al. [2016a] an attack is only considered
successful if the adversarial noise η has small magnitude, say ‖η‖ ≤ , which cannot be recognized
by human beings. The basic concept of buffer zones is illustrated in Figure 2. In Figure 2 we show
a hypothetical decision region without buffer zones and with buffer zones. We also show decision
regions for a single sample from the CIFAR-10 testing set on a vanilla (no defense) ResNet56, as
well as various ResNet BUZz defense configurations. The basic concept is the larger the buffer zone
(the region in gray), the larger the perturbation required to change the input image from its original
class label (in green) to another class label (in blue or red). Figure 2 is the proof-of-concept of the
existence of buffer zones and it implies that any existing attack (i.e., white-box and black box attacks)
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should create sufficient large noises to cross the buffer zones. This fact allows us to achieve our
security goal. A detailed description for how to generate the graphs in Figure 2 is in Supplemental
Material D.1. We explain how to create buffer zone based defenses later in the paper.
Contributions.
• We introduce a new concept called buffer zones which is at the core of a new adversarial ML
defense, coined BUZz. Using this BUZz defense, we are able to reduce the attack success
rate for the strongest black-box adversary to as low as 7% on CIFAR-10 and to 11% for
FashionMNIST for the best known untargeted attack.
• We introduce a new metric called the δ value for comparing defenses. While our defense
does require some drop in clean accuracy (when compared to a vanilla scheme), we use δ to
show that this is an acceptable trade-off for better security (this corresponds to a smaller δ).
• We show through rigorous experimentation with multiple untargeted attacks (black-
box Szegedy et al. [2014], Papernot et al. [2016b], Athalye et al. [2018a], Liu et al. [2017],
Papernot et al. [2017] based FGSM Goodfellow et al. [2014], BIM Kurakin et al. [2017],
MIM Dong et al. [2018], PGD Madry et al. [2018], C&W Carlini and Wagner [2017a] and
EAD Chen et al. [2018]) that the BUZz defense is much better than what other well-known
defenses in the literature can achieve.
• Our defense mechanism provides a spectrum of possible choices between higher clean
accuracy or better security. This allows a user of our defense to select the best trade-off for
themselves, a choice previous unattainable by other defenses.
Paper outline. We organize the paper as follows: in Section 2 we discuss adversarial black-box
attacks. In Section 3 we describe how the performance of a defense can be understood using a new
intuitive metric that combines clean accuracy and the attack success rate. In Section 4 we explain
how our defense based on buffer zones can be realized and the security arguments related to it. We
present comprehensive experimental results for a wide array of attacks and defenses in Section 5.
Finally we offer concluding remarks in Section 6.
2 Preliminary knowledge
2.1 Adversarial examples in an image classification task
The general scheme of a successful attack can be described as follows (see Yuan et al. [2017]). The
adversary is given a trained image classifier (e.g, CNN classifier) F which outputs a class label l for a
given input data (i.e., image) x. The adversary will add a perturbation η to the original input x to get
an adversarial example (or a modified data input) x′, i.e., x′ = x+ η. Normally, η should be small to
make the adversarial noise barely recognizable by humans. Yet, the adversary may be able to fool
the classifier F to produce any desired class label l′( 6= l). Assume that f(x) = (s1, s2, . . . , sk) is a
k-dimensional vector of confidence scores sj of class labels j. We call f(x) the score vector with
0 ≤ sj ≤ 1,
∑k
j=1 sj = 1, and k the number of class labels. The class label l is computed as
l = F (f(x)) = argmax
i∈[1,...,k]
{s1, s2, . . . , sk}.
Given x ∈ [0, 1]d and l′ 6= l = F (f(x)), the attacker wishes to ideally solve min{‖x′ − x‖ : x′ ∈
[0, 1]d} such that F (f(x′)) = l′ 6= l = F (f(x)), where l and l′ are the output labels of x and x′,
‖ · ‖ denotes the distance between two data samples, and d is the number of dimensions of x. An
untargeted attack means that the adversary is happy with any l′ 6= l, while in a targeted attack the
adversary specifies an adversarial label l′ 6= l a-priori.
2.2 Black-box attacks
In this paper we operate under the assumption that the parameters of the classifier are secret, and
focus on a black-box adversary. Black-box attacks use non-gradient information of classifier F such
as (part of) the original training data set X0 Papernot et al. [2016b] and/or a set X1 of adaptively
chosen queries to F (i.e., {(x, l = F (f(x))) : x ∈ X1}) Papernot et al. [2017] – queries in X1 are
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not in the training data set X0. Based on information X0 and X1 the adversary trains its own copy
of the proposed defense. This is an approximation of the defense and is called the synthetic model.
Once the synthetic model has been created the adversary can run white-box attacks on the synthetic
model to create adversarial examples. Then examples are submitted to the defense with the hope that
the adversarial examples created to fool the synthetic model will also fool the defense model. In Liu
et al. [2017] it was shown that the transferability property of adversarial examples between different
models which have the same topology/architecture and are trained over the same dataset is very
high, i.e., nearly 100% for ImageNet Russakovsky et al. [2015]. This explains why the adversarial
examples generated for the synthetic network can often be successful adversarial examples for the
defense network. Black-box attacks can be partitioned into the following categories:
Pure black-box attack Szegedy et al. [2014], Papernot et al. [2016b], Athalye et al. [2018a], Liu
et al. [2017]: The adversary is only given knowledge of a training data set X0.
Oracle based black-box attack Papernot et al. [2017]: The adversary is allowed to adaptively query
target classifier F , which gives information X1.
Based on this information, the adversary builds his own classifier G which is used to produce
adversarial examples using an existing white-box attack methodology. Compared to the native (pure)
black box attack, this attack is supposed to be more efficient because G is intentionally trained with
examples labeled by F . Hence, the transferability between F and G may be significantly higher.
Mixed black-box attack: In this paper we strengthen the original oracle based black-box attack Pa-
pernot et al. [2017] by doing the following: we allow the adversary access to the entire original
training dataset and unlimited query access to the defense to train synthetic network G. Our mixed
black-box attack is more powerful than both the pure black-box attack and oracle based black-box
attack. We further confirm this fact through our experiments in Supplemental Material D.3 (see
Tables 8 and 6).
Zeroth order optimization based black-box attacks or score value vector based black-box at-
tacks Chen et al. [2017]. The adversary does not build any assistant classifier G as done in the
previous black-box attacks. Instead, the adversary adaptively queries {x, f(x), F (f(x))} to approxi-
mate the gradient∇f based on a derivative-free optimization approach. Using the approximated∇f ,
the adversary can build adversarial examples by directly working with f . Another attack in this line
is called SimBA (Simple Black Box Attack) Guo et al. [2019]. This attack also requires the score
vector f(x) to mount the attack.
Decision based black-box attack Chen and Jordan [2019]. As shown in the literature, the adver-
sary is still able to mount a black box attack if he is only allowed to access the decision value, i.e.,
F (f(x)). The main idea of the attack is trying to find the boundaries between the class regions using
a binary searching methodology and gradient approximation for the points located on the boundaries.
This type of attacks is called Boundary Attacks. As mentioned in Chen and Jordan [2019] Boundary
Attacks are not as efficient as pure black box attacks since the adversary has to make many queries to
create successful adversarial examples and this gives large query and computation complexities.
We highlight that oracle based black-box attacks, mixed black-box attacks, score value vector based
black-box attacks and decision based black-box attacks are called adaptive black-box attacks as
defined in Carlini et al. [2019]. In our adversarial model we consider an adversary with only black
box access to labels F (f(x)) for chosen queries x. This assumes that the defender only offers
classification to labels as a service (a reasonable assumption in practice) – and this excludes direct
adversarial knowledge of score vectors f(x). Given this adversarial model, we cover all different
types of adaptive black-box attacks for our proposed defense BUZz: That is, we do not consider
decision based black box attacks because its performance is not as good as the pure black box attack
because of its increased query and computation complexities as mentioned above. Therefore, we only
need to consider pure black box attacks, oracle based black box attacks and mixed black box attacks.
(More discussion is in Supplemental Material A, B.1 and B.2.)
For our defense based on the existence of buffer zones (see Figure 2) any successful attack must
generate a sufficient amount of noise to cross the buffer zone – and since it is hard to find shallow
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parts in the buffer zone for crossing with visually imperceptible noise, we attain better security (a
smaller attack success rate).∗
3 Defense performance metric
We introduce a new metric to properly understand the combined effect of:
1. A drop γ in clean accuracy from an original clean accuracy p to clean accuracy
pd = p− γ (1)
for the defense. Here, clean accuracy p corresponds to a vanilla scheme without defense
strategy in a non-malicious environment. Similarly, clean accuracy pd represents the
accuracy for the defense measured in the non-malicious environment without adversaries.
(We take "clean" to have the additional meaning of being in a non-malicious environment.)
2. The attacker’s success rate α against the defense. If the defense recognizes an adversarial
manipulated image as an adversarial example, then it outputs the adversarial label ⊥ and the
attack is not considered successful. When defining α, we restrict ourselves to adversarial
examples for those images which the defense (in their original non-attacked form) properly
classifies by their correct labels. The attacker’s success rate is then defined as the fraction of
adversarial examples that manipulate these images in such a way that the defense produces
labels different from the correct labels and different from the adversarial label ⊥. For
completeness, literature defines the defense accuracy or defense success rate as 1− α (most
defenses cannot recognize an adversarial manipulated image as an adversarial example and
do not have an adversarial label as possible output).
Proper/Accurate classification by the defense in the presence of adversaries is one of the following:
An image (possibly after adversarial manipulation) is recognized by its correct label (implying no
attack was present or the attack did not work). Or, an adversarial manipulated image is given the
(correct) adversarial label ⊥ (if the defense offers this possibility).
The probability of proper/accurate classification by the defense in the presence of adversaries is equal
to (p− γ)(1− α) (since the defense properly labels a fraction p− γ if no adversary is present and
out of these images a fraction α is successfully attacked if an adversary is present). In other words
(p− γ)(1− α) is the accuracy of the defense in the presence of adversaries (malicious environment).
Going from a non-malicious environment without defense to a malicious environment with defense
gives a drop in accuracy of
δ = p− (p− γ)(1− α) = γ + (p− γ)α. (2)
δ can be used to measure the effectiveness of different defenses, the smaller the better. If two defenses
offer roughly the same δ, then it makes sense to consider their (γ, α) pairs and choose the defense
that either has the smaller α or the smaller γ.
We may use subscript t and u in δt and δu when differentiating for targeted attacks and untargeted
attacks. Since untargeted attacks are easier to pull off, δt ≤ δu. In this paper we focus on defending
against the easier untargeted attacks and use δ = δu. I.e., we also want to defend against the range of
attacks that are easier for an attacker to have success with.
From a pure ML perspective, in order for a defense to perform well in a non-malicious environment,
we want γ very small or, equivalently, pd close to p. From a pure security perspective, in order for a
defense to perform well in a malicious environment, we want δ to be small. Therefore, for properly
comparing defenses we focus on tuples (δ = γ + (p− γ)α, pd = p− γ), where α corresponds to the
best attacker’s success rate across the best known (untargeted, respectively targeted) attacks from
literature. Notice that the vanilla scheme can be considered in a malicious environment as well and
this will correspond to some (δvan, pd = p). Clearly defenses that result in δ ≥ δvan do not improve
over implementing no defense at all (which is the plain vanilla scheme).
It turns out that having both γ and δ small is difficult to achieve: See (2), the smaller γ, the more δ
behaves like pα and as of now we do not know how to achieve a very small attacker’s success rate
∗We hypothesise, but did not verify, that this problem remains difficult for an attacker even if s/he has been
given access to the score vector f(x) (implying that score value vector based attacks are also more difficult to
pull off). We stress though that in our adversarial model the BUZz defense only outputs F (f(x)) and not f(x).
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α, say less than a couple percent, while keeping γ very small. In this paper we show α < 11% for
defenses based on buffer zones – this is significantly lower than what other state-of-the-art defenses
offer, but is at the cost of a higher γ.
4 Methodology
The BUZz defense is based on the concept of buffer zones. Buffer zones are the regions in between
classes where if an input falls in this region, it is marked as adversarial. In theory, this forces the
adversary to add noise η greater than a certain magnitude in order to overcome (cross over) the buffer
zone. Because an attack fails if the noise becomes visual perceptible to humans, the adversary is
limited in terms of the magnitude of η. In many cases this means the adversary may not be able to
overcome the buffer zone and therefore cannot fool the classifier. The natural question is how can
buffer zones be implemented in classifiers? In this section we discuss different techniques that can be
used to create buffer zones.
4.1 Realizing buffer zones through thresholding
For a given single classifier or network, we can create buffer zones between the regions of class labels
based on a threshold mechanism. Assume f(x) = (s1, ..., sk) as the vector of confidence scores
where si is the score of class labels j for a given classifier f and input x. The corresponding predicted
class label l is different from ⊥ if there exists at least one si such as si ≥ θ where θ ∈ [0, 1].
Security argument. Intuitively, the buffer zones between the regions are created because of the
following reason. Assume that the input x locates at the center of a region with class label 0 as in
Figure 2. Then the score value of s0 should be very high, i.e., close to 1. Score s0 drops when x
moves towards the boundary between regions having class labels 0 and 1, while s1 increases. Score s1
will be highest when x reaches the center of the region with class label 1. Therefore, using threshold
θ, we effectively create buffer zones between the regions. It implies that the adversary must create a
sufficient large noise η to make x jump from the region with class label 0 to the region with class
label 1 across the buffer zones between them.
Advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of the threshold approach is that it is very simple,
efficient and straightforward to implement. It does not require any image transforms or classifier
retraining. However, there are drawbacks to this approach. For certain datasets with low complexity
(see Supplemental Material D.3 for Fashion-MNIST in Table 7) this technique offers only limited
security, even when the threshold is set as high as 0.99. Furthermore, if only a single network is
involved, then other black-box attacks may be developed where the focus is merely on producing
high confidence adversarial examples using the synthetic network.
4.2 Realizing buffer zones through multiple networks
Buffer zones can be created through the use of multiple networks. A naïve approach to this method
would be to simply use networks with different architectures. However, we experimentally show
that merely using different architectures does not yield security. This has also been shown in the
literature in Liu et al. [2017]. To break transferability between networks we introduce secret image
transformations for each classifier. Our defense is composed of multiple classifiers is depicted in
Figure 3 (right). Each CNN has two unique image transformations as shown in Figure 3 (left). The
first is a fixed randomized linear transformation c(x) = Ax+ b, where A is a matrix and b is a vector.
After the linear transformation a resizing operation i is applied to the image before it is fed into the
CNN. The CNN corresponding to c and i is trained on clean data {i(c(x))}. This results in a weight
vector w. The m protected layers in Figure 3 are described by ‘parameters’ (cj , ij , wj)mj=1.
When a user wants to query the defense, input x is submitted to each protected network which
computes its corresponding image transformation and executes its CNN. The outputs of the protected
networks are class labels (lj)mj=1. The final class label of BUZz, i.e., the composition of the m
protected networks, is a majority vote based on a threshold κ. In our experiments we use unanimous
voting, i.e., if the networks do not all output the same class label then the adversarial/undetermined
class label ⊥ is given as the output (i.e., κ = m).
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Protected Network 1
Protected Network m
l1
lm
x
l = majority(l1, . . . , lm)
#l ≥ κ ? ⊥ /l
Figure 3: Design of protected network (left) and BUZz: majority voting and threshold κ (right).
Security argument. In a multi-classifier defense, buffer zones can be established by using majority
voting and diminishing the transferability among the different classifiers through image transforma-
tions. To decrease the transferability, we can train each classifier on a different transformed input x.
From Guo et al. [2017] we know adversarial examples are sensitive to image transformations which
either distort the value of the pixels in the image or change the original spatial location of the pixels.
In the context of Papernot’s oracle based black-box attack and pure black-box attack, the adversarial
noise η is created based on a white-box attack for a synthetic network (score vector) g of BUZz.
It means that the noise η is specifically developed for g. Since the x′ = x + η is input into
every protected network of BUZz, the j-th layer will apply its CNN network on a noisy image
ij(cj(x
′)) = ij(cj(x+ η)), which due to the linearity of ij(cj(·)) is equal to ij(cj(x)) + ij(cj(η)).
Therefore, networks receive different input noise ij(cj(η)) 6= η. Since the transformations are
different for each of the classifiers that participate in the majority vote, the attack success rate can
be reduced. It is important to note that in this paper we have experimentally established that image
resizing and linear transformations can reduce the transferability. However, there may be other image
transformations that can also accomplish this goal. Notice though that it has cost us significant time
and effort to find the proposed transformations since the drop γ in clean accuracy should be designed
as small as possible.
Advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of BUZz using multiple networks and image
transformations is that it can achieve a higher defense accuracy for certain datasets (we show
this experimentally in Supplemental Material D.3 for Fashion-MNIST in Table 7) than only using
thresholding. We also have more control over the tradeoff between the attacker’s success rate and
clean accuracy using the linear transformation Ax+ b. Here A is a fixed n by n matrix and b a fixed
n by n bias. For example, if only b is random (with small magnitude) and A is identity, it results
in less image distortion (so higher clean accuracy) but also less security (more adversarial samples
bypass the defense). The disadvantage of this approach is that each network must be retrained to
handle a certain image transformation.
4.3 Realizing buffer zones through combinational approaches
Previously we discussed how buffer zones can be realized through thresholding or through multiple
networks with image transformations. A natural extension of these two techniques is a combinational
approach. In this type of defense multiple networks with image transformations are employed, some
of which also implement thresholding. In this way we can reduce the number of classifiers that need
to be retrained. At the same time in this defense we still have the extra flexibility that the linear
transformation provides in choosing between security and clean accuracy. We experiment with this
combinational approach, e.g., BUZz2 has two classifiers of which one uses a threshold 0.70 (BT2-70).
It is important to note that it may be possible to further combine other defense techniques such as
adversarial retraining Tramèr et al. [2017] with BUZz. However, the goal of this paper is not to
exhaustively test every defense combination but merely propose and experimentally verify a working
defense framework.
5 Experiments
In this section we provide experimental results to show the effectiveness of the BUZz defense. We
experiment with two popular datasets, Fashion-MNIST Xiao et al. [2017] and CIFAR-10 Krizhevsky
et al.. Fashion-MNIST is a 10-class dataset that has 60,000 training and 10,000 testing images in
grayscale. CIFAR-10 is also a 10-class dataset with 50,000 training and 10,000 testing images in
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color. All images are normalized in the range [0,1] with a shift of -0.5 so that they are in the range
[-0.5, 0.5]. In terms of network architecture, we use ResNet56 He et al. [2016] for the networks
in the CIFAR-10 defenses and VGG16 Simonyan and Zisserman [2014] for the networks in the
Fashion-MNIST defenses. Full architectural details as well as their standard training procedure can
be found in Supplemental Material C.
5.1 Defenses
BUZz Defenses. For the BUZz defense, we experimented with three different variants. We tested
buffer zones based on image transformations, buffer zones based on thresholding and buffer zones
based on a combination of image transformations and thresholding. For BUZz based on image
transformations each network has an image transformation selected from mappings c(x) = Ax+ b.
We explain how we chose the randomized A and b based on the dataset in Supplementary Material
C. We can think of an image transformation cj(x) as an extra randomly fixed layer added to the
layers which form the j-th CNN. We tested three of these designs: One with 8 networks each using
a different image resizing operation from 32 to 32, 40, 48, 64, 72, 80, 96, 104. The second with 4
networks being the subset of the 8 networks that use image resizing operations from 32 to 32, 48, 72,
96. The third with 2 networks being a subset of the 8 networks that use image resizing operations
from 32 to 32 and 104.
For buffer zones based on thresholding we tested the following BUZz thresholding configurations: a
single vanilla network with thresholding cutoff 0.7, thresholding cutoff 0.95 and thresholding cutoff
0.95. For the combination of the two approaches we tested BUZz-2 with thresholding: each network
has the mapping c(x) = Ax + b, one of the networks has a resize operation 32 (no resize), the
second network has a resize operation 104 and a thresholding cutoff (0.7 for CIFAR-10 and 0.95 for
Fashion-MNIST).
Literature defenses. In addition to our buffer zone based defense, we also test other defenses from
the literature. While it is impossible to exhaustively test all published defenses, here we focus
on a selection of the most prominent ones including Xie et al. [2018], Liu et al. [2017], Cao and
Gong [2017], Cohen et al. [2019], Guo et al. [2017], Tramèr et al. [2017], Srisakaokul et al. [2018].
See Supplemental Material B.3 for a discussion on a more extensive list of defenses together with
experimental results.
5.2 Attacks
The black-box attacks we experiment with can be divided into two different types. The first type is
generation of the synthetic model using training data and synthetic data labeled by the oracle Papernot
et al. [2017] which we call the mixed black-box attack. The second type of black-box attack
we consider is the pure black-box attack. In this attack the generation of the synthetic model is
accomplished using the original training dataset and original training labels. In both black-box attacks
after the synthetic model is generated, we can run any white-box attack on the synthetic model
to create adversarial samples to try and fool the defense. The white-box attacks we consider are
FGSM Goodfellow et al. [2015], BIM Kurakin et al. [2017], MIM Dong et al. [2018], PGD Madry et al.
[2018], Carlini&WagnerCarlini and Wagner [2017a] and EAD Chen et al. [2018] (see Supplemental
Material B.1).
5.3 Experimental analysis
We first observe that experiments show that the pure black-box attack is always equal to or weaker
than the mixed black-box attack. For CIFAR-10, Figure 1 plots for various defenses the clean accuracy
pd and δ value for best untargeted black-box attacks among the ones listed above (MIM is generally
the best performing). The defenses considered are BUZz 2, 4, 8, BUZz using threshold cutoff 0.7,
0.95 and 0.99, the combination BT2-70, and plain classifier (Vanilla), Xie’s: Randomized 1-Net Xie
et al. [2018], Liu’s: Mixed Arch 2-Net Liu et al. [2017], Cao’s: randomized smooth technique Cao
and Gong [2017], Cohen et al. [2019], Guo’s: this is BUZz with a single network Guo et al. [2017],
Tramer’s: adversarial training Tramèr et al. [2017], MD2 and MD4 Srisakaokul et al. [2018]. For
example BUZz2 achieves pd = 0.85 and defender success rate 1− α = 0.68, which yields, by using
p = 0.93 for the vanilla scheme, δ = 0.93 − 0.85 × 0.68 = 0.36 and γ = 0.93 − 0.85 = 0.07.
We see that for the broader class of untargeted attacks BUZz offers a significantly better defense
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when compared to our selection of most prominent defenses in literature. Minimal δ = 0.22 or 0.23
is achieved for BUZz4 with α = 0.14 and γ = 0.12 (top left corner); BT99 with α = 0.11 and
γ = 0.14; BUZz8 with α = 0.07 and γ = 0.17. Among these BUZz4 maximizes clean accuracy
pd = p − γ. Notice that the smallest α in literature by Liu Liu et al. [2017] is 0.37, significantly
higher than for BUZz (although Liu only has a drop γ = 0.07; in this case our BT95 achieves lower
α = 0.23 for the same γ = 0.07). Supplemental Material D.3 provides extensive details in the form
of tables for our experiments on CIFAR-10 as well as Fashion-MNIST (for both untargeted and
targeted attacks). For Fashion-MNIST we have p = 0.94 with BUZz4 giving δ = 0.26 with α = 0.11
and γ = 0.17.
6 Conclusion
We introduced a new concept called buffer zones which is at the core of a new adversarial ML defense,
coined BUZz. Using this BUZz defense, we are able to reduce the attack success rate to as low
as 7% for the strongest black-box adversary on CIFAR-10 and to 11% for Fashion-MNIST. This
methodology offers defense accuracy much better than other well-known defenses in the literature
which we show through rigorous experimentation with multiple attacks (black-box based FGSM,
BIM, MIM, PGD, C&W and EAD, where we introduced the stronger mixed black-box attack). While
our defense does require some drop in clean accuracy, we have shown that this is an acceptable
trade-off for better security using a new metric called the δ value. The metric is used to compare
the clean accuracy of a vanilla scheme without adversaries, i.e., non-malicious environment without
defense, versus the accuracy of a scheme with defense in the presence of adversaries, i.e., malicious
environment with defense. In addition, we are the first to provide a spectrum of possible choices
between higher clean accuracy or higher security. This allows a user of our defense to select the best
trade-off for themselves, a choice previous unattainable by other defenses.
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Broader Impact Statement
Machine learning has shown to be of crucial importance in data analytics. During the last decade
deep learning and reinforcement learning together with multicore and GPU based computing have
been able to push the field forward. Classification models can be learned with better and better clean
accuracies. A central question, however, is whether the learned models can be fooled by adversaries.
Adversarial machine learning – and, in particular, black-box attacks on classification models – is a
serious threat to economy and safety. If adversarial examples are successful, then this may jeopardize
the safety offered by applications that use image recognition software, etc. Research in adversarial
machine learning aims at creating a solid understanding and theory on how adversarial examples can
be generated and how defense mechanisms can be designed to filter out adversarial examples or to
still label them correctly. The proposed δ-metric allows proper comparison of defense mechanisms
across clean accuracy and attacker’s success rate trade-offs – the resulting benchmarking will help the
scientific community to focus on promising defense heuristics and discard those which clearly do not
help reducing δ. Within this perspective, the paper also introduces buffer zones as a new technique
for creating defenses that significantly reduce δ.
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Buffer Zone based Defense against Adversarial
Examples in Image Classification
Supplementary Material
A Adversarial model
The strength of an attack is relative to the considered adversarial model. In adversarial Machine
Learning (ML) the assumed capabilities of an attacker are a mix of:
Having knowledge of the parameters and architecture of the defense network/classifier. The
architecture and methodology of how the defense network is trained is about how the
defense operates and its underlying philosophy. In cryptography this is similar to the actual
design of a security primitive and this is never assumed to be hidden as this would lead to
the undesirable practice of security by obscurity. The secret key of the security primitive is
kept private; the method of how the secrect key is generated using a probabilistic algorithm
is public. Similarly, the parameters of a defense network can be considered to be private
while the method of their training is public. If the adversarial model does not assume the
parameters to be private, then all is public and we call this a white-box setting. If the
parameters are considered to be private and not given to the attacker (for ‘free’), then we
call this a black-box setting.
Having access to the defense classifier a.k.a. target model. If the parameters are kept private,
then the next best adversarial capability is having access to the target model as a black-box.
The idea is that the adversary can adaptively query the target model with own input images
for which class labels are being returned. Here, we have two flavors: only a class label is
returned, or more information is given in the form of a score vector which entries represent
confidences scores of each of the classes (the returned class label is the one with maximal
confidence score).
In the white-box setting where all parameters are known, the attacker can reproduce the
target model and access the target model as a black-box. Confusing in adversarial ML is that
white-box attacks are the ones that ‘only’ use the parameters in the white-box setting to
learn gradients of the target model which are used to produce adversarial examples – these
attacks do not consider/use black-box access. This means that white-box defenses are not
necessarily analysed against black-box attacks where the adversary only has black-box
access to the target model with possibly the added capability described below.
Having access to (part of the) training data. The training data which is used to train the parame-
ters of the defense network is often public knowledge. Knowing the methodology of how
the defense network is trained, an adversary can apply the same methodology to train its
own synthetic defense network – and this can be used to find adversarial examples. The
synthetic network will not be exactly the same as the defense network since training is done
by randomized (often SGD-like) algorithms where training data is used in random order.
This means that knowledge of the training data is less informative than knowledge of the
parameters as in the white-box setting.
The white-box setting describes the capabilities of the strongest adversary, while the black-box setting
describes a weaker adversary who cannot exactly reproduce the target model (and can only estimate
the target model by training a synthetic network). White-box attacks on the other hand restrict the
adversary in that only oracle access to the gradient of f is allowed. Black-box attacks only allow
oracle access to the target model itself and oracle access to training data. In this sense white-box
attacks in adversarial ML literature exclude access to the above black-box oracles. This means that
even though a white-box defense may be able to resist a white-box attack, it can still be vulnerable to
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a black-box attack. Vice versa, even though a white-box defense may be broken under a white-box
attack, it may still survive in the black-box setting.
Taking BUZz as an example, we may mathematically formalize the black-box adversary† (as is done
in crypto/security literature) as an adversarial algorithm AT which has access to
• a random oracle representing l← BUZzθ(x) where parameters θ = (cj , ij , wj)mj=1, input x
is an image, and l is the outputted label of the target classifier BUZz (we denote the collected
(x, l) by set X1), and
• a random oracle ξD which outputs at most D times ‘training data’ according to the distri-
bution from which the training data is taken from (we denote the collected (x, l) by set X0
which represents the ’original training data’); by abuse of notation ξ denotes the distribution
itself.
Subscript T denotes the allowed number of computation steps plus oracle accesses to BUZzθ and ξD.
In our experiments we test the most powerful existing black-box attacks and do not mention T ; here,
T just means the amount of steps allowed by existing practical attack methodologies. If an attacker
with unlimited access (T = ∞) to BUZzθ can scan region boundaries, then this achieves optimal
success rates.
Subscript D in ξD indicates the number of training data an attacker is allowed to use for the attack.
D represents an important metric in machine learning as the amount of training data cannot be
assumed infinite (with respect to the application there is a concrete limit to how many training data is
available; collecting samples from ξ is not straightforward, e.g., making a true new picture/image of
a plane takes effort). How strong we make e.g. Papernot’s black-box attack is based on how much
training data we give it: In their paper D = 150 is used for MNIST in order to train a synthetic
network while in our experiments we use D = 50K which is the entire original training data set of
CIFAR-10 (and leaves 10K test data). Since the attack uses the synthetic network in a (targeted or
untargeted) white-box attack (with small enough ) to generate an adversarial example, the probability
of successfully changing the label depends on how similar the synthetic network classifies data
compared to the target model with defense – it depends on the tranferability between the synthetic
and defense classifiers and transferability improves for larger D.
The aim of the adversary is to produce a perturbation η ← AξD,BUZzθT (x) (just based on the
oracle accesses described above indicated by superscripts and based on input x) which is visually
imperceptible, i.e. ‖η‖ ≤ , and for which x′ = x+ η gives a different label (and is not classified by
the adversarial label ⊥): The attacker’s success rate for untargeted black-box attacks is defined as the
probability
α = Prx←ξ(η ← AξD,BUZzθT (x), ‖η‖ ≤ , BUZzθ(x+η) /∈ {⊥, lab(x)} | BUZzθ(x) = lab(x)),
where lab(x) represents the correct label according to the human eye.
For targeted black-box attacks we replace BUZzθ(x+ η) /∈ {⊥, lab(x)} by BUZzθ(x+ η) = l′, and
take the probability over both x← ξ and l′ ← {1..k} \ {lab(x)}. In the above notations we do not
explicitly state that the adversary also has knowledge of the distribution from which θ is taken, i.e., the
adversary knows the philosophy behind our defense together with what type of image transformations
are being used and knows the architecture in terms of number of nodes and connections at each layer
of the CNN networks and how they are trained.
The above formalism helps in making the adversarial model in terms of adversarial capabilities
precise. We will not explicitly use the formalism as we cannot prove statements about general classes
of adversarial algorithms A (our defense does not allow ‘standard’ reduction proofs to some hard
computational problem as is done in crypto).
From a cryptographer’s perspective we want the above probability α (i.e., the attacker’s success rate)
to be as small as possible. Notice that the smallest possible α = 0 decreases the miss classification
rate to 1− (p− γ) ≥ 1− p (see Section 3, the miss classification rate as a function of α is equal to
1 − (p − γ)(1 − α)). Since in practical ML the miss classification rate 1 − p for vanilla schemes
(without defense) is strictly larger than 0, it makes no sense to require (as we often do in crypto) an
asymptotic guarantee like demanding α to be negligible in some security parameter λ where images
†Similarly a white-box adversary with only oracle access to gradient information can be modeled.
14
x are poly(λ)-sized. In stead we measure α in percentages and a couple percent is considered very
small.
B Related work: comparison to known Defenses
B.1 White-box attacks
As explained and motivated in the introduction, we restrict ourselves to the black-box setting where
the parameters of our defense are kept secret. Hence, this disallows direct white-box attacks and
zeroth order optimization based black-box attacks. However, it is important to note that once a
synthetic model has been trained, any white-box attack can be run on the synthetic model to create an
adversarial example. The adversary can then check if this example fools the defense.
Essentially any white-box attack can be run on the synthetic model to try to exploit the transferability
between classifiers Papernot et al. [2016b]. We briefly introduce the following commonly used
white-box attacks in the literature.
We briefly introduce the following commonly used white-box attacks in literature.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) Goodfellow et al. [2014]. x′ = x′ + × sign(∇xL(x, l; θ)
where L is a loss function (e.g, cross entropy) of model f .
Basic Iterative Methods (BIM) Kurakin et al. [2017]. x′i = clipx,(x′i−1 +

r ×
sign(∇x′i−1L(x′i−1, l; θ)) where x′0 = x, r is the number of iterations, clip is a clipping opera-
tion.
Momentum Iterative Methods (MIM) Dong et al. [2018]. This is a variant of BIM using momen-
tum trick to create the gradient gi, i.e., x′i = clipx,(x
′
i−1 +

r × sign(gi)).
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) Madry et al. [2018]. This is also a variant of BIM where the
clipping operation is replaced by a projection operation.
Carlini and Wagner attack (C&W)Carlini and Wagner [2017a]. We define x′(ω) = 12 (tanhω+
1) and g(x) = max(max(si : i 6= l) − si,−κ) where f(x) = (s1, s2, . . .) is the score vector of
input x of classifier f and κ controls the confidence on the adversarial examples. The adversary
builds the following objective function for finding the adversarial noise.
min
ω
‖x′(ω)− x‖22 + cf(x′(ω)),
where c is a constant chosen by a modified binary search.
Elastic Net Attack (EAD) Chen et al. [2018]. This is the variant of C&W attack with the following
objective function.
min
ω
‖x′(ω)− x‖22 + β‖x′(ω)− x‖1 + cf(x′(ω)).
B.2 Black-box attacks.
Black-box attacks use non-gradient information of classifier F such as (part of) the original training
data set X0 Papernot et al. [2016b] and/or a set X1 of addaptively chosen queries to F (i.e., {(x, l =
F (f(x))) : x ∈ X1}) Papernot et al. [2017] – queries in X1 are not in the training data set X0. These
type of attacks exploit the transferability property of adversarial examples Papernot et al. [2016b],
Liu et al. [2017]: Based on information X0 and X1 the adversary trains its own copy of the proposed
defense. This is called the adversarial synthetic network/model and is used to create adversarial
examples for the target model. Liu et al. [2017] shows that the transferability property of adversarial
examples between different models which have the same topology/architecture and are trained over
the same dataset is very high, i.e., nearly 100% for ImageNet Russakovsky et al. [2015]. This explains
why the adversarial examples generated for the synthetic network can often be successful adversarial
examples for the defense network.
Black-box attacks can be partitioned into the following categories:
Pure black-box attack Szegedy et al. [2014], Papernot et al. [2016b], Athalye et al. [2018a], Liu
et al. [2017]. The adversary is only given knowledge of a training data set X0. Based on this
information, the adversary builds his own classifier g which is used to produce adversarial examples
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using an existing white-box attack methodology. These adversarial examples of g may also be the
adversarial examples of f due to the transferability property between f and g.
Oracle based black-box attack Papernot et al. [2017]. The adversary is allowed to adaptively query
target classifier F , which gives information X1. Based on this information, the adversary builds his
own classifier G which is used to produce adversarial examples using an existing white-box attack
methodology. Again, the generated adversarial examples for G may also be able fool classifier F due
to the transferability property between F and G. Compared to the native (pure) black box attack, this
attack is supposed to be more efficient because G is intentionally trained to be similar to F . Hence,
the transferability between F and G may be significantly higher.
Zeroth order optimization based black-box attacks or Score Value Vector based black-box at-
tacks Chen et al. [2017]. The adversary does not build any assistant classifier g as done in the previous
black-box attacks. Instead, the adversary adaptively queries {x, f(x), F (f(x))} to approximate the
gradient ∇f based on a derivative-free optimization approach. Using the approximated ∇f , the
adversary can build adversarial examples by directly working with the classifier f . Another attack in
this line is called SimBA (Simple Black Box Attack) Guo et al. [2019]. This attack also requires the
score vector f(x) to mount the attack.
Decision based black-box attack Chen and Jordan [2019]. As shown in the literature, the adver-
sary is still able to mount a black box attack if he is only allowed to access the decision value, i.e.,
F (f(x)). The main idea of the attack is to try to find the boundaries between the class regions using
a binary searching methodology and gradient approximation for the points located on the boundaries.
This type of attacks are called Boundary Attacks. As mentioned in Chen and Jordan [2019] Boundary
Attacks are not efficient as a pure black box attack.
In this paper, we analyze a mixed black-box attack where the synthetic network g (which outputs
the score vector for the full classifier G) is built based on the training data set X0 of the target model
F and is based on addaptively chosen queries X1. Our mixed black-box attack is more powerful
than both the pure black-box attack and oracle based black-box attack. We further confirm this fact
through our experiments in Supplemental Material D.3 (see Tables 6, 7 and 8).
B.3 Defenses against white-box and black-box attacks
White-Box defenses. White-box defenses are any defense with an adversarial model that allows the
adversary oracle access to the gradient of the target model. These defenses include Papernot et al.
[2016a], Kurakin et al. [2016], Tramèr et al. [2017], Cao and Gong [2017], Metzen et al. [2017],
Feinman et al. [2017], Xie et al. [2018], Meng and Chen [2017], Srisakaokul et al. [2018] to name a
few. A complete list is given in Athalye et al. [2018a], Carlini and Wagner [2017a] except for the
unpublished work Srisakaokul et al. [2018] which appeared later. So far, any defense with public
weights and architecture turns out to be vulnerable to FGSM, IFGSM, or Carlini type attacks Carlini
and Wagner [2017a,b], Athalye et al. [2018a], Liu et al. [2017]; we will argue the vulnerability of
Srisakaokul et al. [2018] below.
In order to implement a white-box attack Yuan et al. [2017] constructs perturbation η with the help of
gradient ∇f(·): for example, η = × sign(∇xL(x, l; θ) in the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM)
by Goodfellow et al. [2014], where θ represents the parameters of f , L is a loss function (e.g, cross
entropy) of model f . ( can be thought of as relating to the maximum amount of noise which is
not visually perceptible.) In Appendix B.1, the short description of some widely known white-box
attacks is provided. To defend against adversarial examples, many methodologies have been proposed
and they all employ the same strategy, i.e., gradient masking Papernot et al. [2017] respectively
obfuscated gradient Athalye et al. [2018a]. As pointed out in Athalye et al. [2018a], there are three
main methods for realizing this strategy: shattered gradients, stochastic gradients and exploding &
vanishing gradients. In Athalye et al. [2018a], the authors propose three different types of attacks:
1. Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA). The attack is applied for pro-
tected network f(t(x)) where t(x) is not differentiable and t(x) ≈ x. The adversary will
replace t(x) in the backward phase for computing the gradient by x and thus, he can compute
the approximated gradient∇xf(t(x))|x=xˆ ≈ ∇xf(x)|x=t(xˆ.
2. Expectation over Transformation (EOT). In this case, the adversary computes the gradient
of Et∼T f(t(x)) where t(x) is a random transformation and t is sampled from a distribution
T . The gradient can be computed as∇Et∼T f(t(x)) = Et∼T∇f(t(x)).
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3. Reparameterization. The protected network f(t(x)) has t(x) which performs some opti-
mization loop to transform the input x to a new input xˆ. This step will make the gradient
exploding or vanishing, i.e., the adversary cannot compute the gradient. To cope with this
defense, Athalye et al. [2018a] proposes to make a change-of-variable x = h(z) for some
h(·) such that t(h(z)) = h(z) for all z but h(·) is differentiable.
In literature, many white-box defenses have shown a predictable cat and mouse type of security game.
In this repeated chain of events, the defender creates a network defense and the attacker comes up
with a new type of attack that breaks the defense. The defender then creates a new defense which the
attacker again breaks. While this occurs frequently in security, a simple example of this occurring in
the field of adversarial machine learning is the FGSM attack breaking standard CNNs, the distillation
defense mitigating FGSM, and the distillation defense’s subsequent break by Carlini Papernot et al.
[2016a], Carlini and Wagner [2017b]. Alternatively, in an even worse case, the defense can be
immediately broken without the need for new attack strategies. In adversarial machine learning an
example of this is the autoencoder defense of Meng and Chen [2017] which is vulnerable to the attack
in Carlini and Wagner [2017b]. From our analysis of the previous literature it is clear that a secure
pure white-box defense is extremely challenging to design.
Black-box defenses based on a single network. We discuss how the white-box defenses of Papernot
et al. [2016a], Kurakin et al. [2016], Tramèr et al. [2017], Cao and Gong [2017], Metzen et al. [2017],
Feinman et al. [2017], Xie et al. [2018], Meng and Chen [2017], Guo et al. [2017], Srisakaokul et al.
[2018] are vulnerable in a black-box setting.
As shown in Papernot et al. [2017], the adversary can build a synthetic network g which simulates
the target vanilla network. This can be used to produce high transferability adversarial examples
(that transfer to the target model with significant success). Boundary alignment is the well-known
explanation, see Papernot et al. [2016b].
Papernot et al. [2016a] proposes a single network defense with a better adversarial robustness property
based on distillation: First, given a training data set, a network is built and trained. After this, the
softmax output (i.e., score vector) of the network is used to train another network with the original
training data set. This process is called ’distillation’ and the distilled network is argued to have better
robustness against white-box attacks. However, Carlini and Wagner [2016] showed a white-box
attack against this defense. Moreover, Papernot et al. [2017] showed that for the MNIST dataset, the
success rate of Papernot’s black-box attack (untargeted) is at least 70%.
In Kurakin et al. [2016], the authors discuss how to train the network for ImageNet with adversarial
examples to make it robust against adversarial machine learning. During each epoch in the training
process, adversarial examples are generated and again used in the training process. According to
Table 4 in Kurakin et al. [2016], the success rate of (untargeted) pure black box attack on ImageNet
using FGSM is high ≥ 50%. The authors in Tramèr et al. [2017] also claim that the adversarial
training in Kurakin et al. [2016] may not be useful.
Tramèr et al. [2017] proposes another type of adversarial training method. The adversarial examples
are generated by doing attacks on different networks with different attack methods. After this the
designer trains the new network with the generated adversarial examples. The authors argued that
this adversarial training can make the adversarially trained network more robust against (pure) black-
box attacks because it is trained with adversarial examples from different sources (i.e., pre-trained
networks). In other words, the network is supposed to have better robustness against black-box
attack generalization across models. As shown in Athalye et al. [2018b], the adversarially trained
network is vulnerable to white-box attack. Regarding pure black-box attack, as reported in Table 4
in Tramèr et al. [2017], the success rate of (untargeted) pure black box attack on ImageNet using
FGSM – the best known black box attack that has been executed on this defense – is ≥ 27%. We
verify the efficiency of this approach for CIFAR-10 in this paper. We do the adversarial retraining
using data from 5 other networks to build a 6th network. The 5 other networks are from the Mul-Def
paper Srisakaokul et al. [2018] (we also rigorously discuss this paper next few paragraphs). Network
0, is a vanilla ResNet. Network 1 is a ResNet with 30% adv training from network 0. Network 2 is
a ResNet with 30% adv training (15% from network 0, 15% from network 1). Etc. until we get to
Network 5. After training we run the full Papernot attack on Network 5. The full result we can find
in Table 8, i.e., Adv Retrained 1-Net. The defense has clean prediction accuracy of 86% and the best
attack on the defense is untargeted PGD with success rate of 55%.
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Cao and Gong [2017] proposes a white-box defense based on the following trick: for a given sample
x, the defense collects many samples x′1, · · · , x′n in a small hypercube centered at x. Then, the
outputted class label is the one which gains the majority vote among F (f(x′1)), · · · , F (f(x′n)) where
F is the output function of network f . As discussed in Cohen et al. [2019], this is a very first
implementation of a class of defense called "Randomized Smoothing" technique. In Table 8, we
perform mixed black box attacks on this defense and see that the defense is vulnerable to mixed black
box attacks, i.e., the defense has clean prediction accuracy of 92% and the best attack on the defense
is untargeted MIM with success rate of 61%.
In Metzen et al. [2017], the authors constructed a defense of a single network f with an additional
‘detector’ network g. The ‘detector network’ is built based on the training data set of the main network
f together with adversarial examples generated for training data samples. The detector network
is used to distinguish clean samples from adversarial samples. The authors in Carlini and Wagner
[2017a] showed white-box and black-box attacks on this defense. The success rate of untargeted pure
black-box attack on MNIST using the C&W attack by Carlini and Wagner [2016] is at least 84%.
In Feinman et al. [2017], the authors built a detector to distinguish adversarial examples from clean
examples using Bayesian uncertainty estimate or Kernel Density Estimator. The key idea is that since
the adversarial and clean examples do not belong to the same manifolds, the defender can build a
detector. Carlini and Wagner [2017a] showed a white-box attack on this defense and clearly claim
that the defense does not work if the dataset is CIFAR-10 for both white-box attack and black-box
attack, i.e., the success rate of untargeted pure attack seems at least 80% based on their explanation.
Xie et al. [2018] has a single network and uniformly selects an image transformation from an a-priori
fixed set of a small number of image transformations to defeat white-box attacks. In the white-box
setting Athalye et al. [2018a] shows that this defense does not work. But is this defense secure against
black-box attacks? To maintain a sufficiently high clean accuracy, the random image transformations
should not have high randomness. Hence, the boundaries of any single network/classifier and the
network/classifier with one of the random image transformations may be highly aligned. This
implies that the adversarial examples created for any classifier will likely transfer to the network with
randomization operations. This is confirmed by experiments reported in Table 8. We can see that the
defense accuracy (i.e., clean accuracy for the defense model) is 82% and the attacker’s success rate
of the untargeted mixed black-box attack (using MIM) is 73%.
Similarly, the defense proposed in Meng and Chen [2017] – a defense with a single network and
multiple different auto-encoders as image transformations from which one is selected at random per
query – is not secure against pure black-box attacks, i.e., the success rate of targeted pure black-box
attack on the defense using C&W attack for CIFAR-10 and MNIST is at least 99%, see Carlini and
Wagner [2017b].
In Guo et al. [2017], the designer selects a set of possible image transformations for a single network
and keeps the selection of the chosen image transformation secret. The image transformation will
distort the noise as explained in Guo et al. [2017]. This is BUZz for a single protection layer (without
multiple networks and threshold voting). However, there is no buffer zones for any single network
and thus, there exist many adversarial examples with small noises. We have validated this claim
for BUZz with a single protection layer because it is very close to the one in Guo et al. [2017]. In
Table 8, the best attack is the untargeted one with a success rate for CIFAR-10 equal to 56% and a
clean accuracy equal to 90%.
Black-box defenses based on multiple networks. In Liu et al. [2017], the authors study the
transferability between different networks which have different structures for the ImageNet dataset.
The authors report that the transferability between the networks is small (claimed to be ’close to
zero’). For this reason, it may be possible to have the BUZz defense where protected networks have
different architectures. However, experimentally we have built a defense with VGG16 and ResNet56
trained on CIFAR-10. As reported in Table 8, the 2-net BUZz with 2 ResNet56 architectures and
image transformations and the 2-net defense with 1 VGG16 and 1 ResNet56 (Mixed Arch 2-Net) that
has no image transformations has worse performance. It implies that having different architectures
does not give us a significant advantage in a BUZz defense.
In unpublished work Srisakaokul et al. [2018] the authors have proposed a defense against white-box
attacks based on multiple networks with the same architecture. The authors develop their defense
based on a retraining technique. First, the authors apply adversarial attacks on each network to
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generate a set of adversarial examples. For example, for each network j a white-box attack produces
a set of adversarial examples Sj . Next network j will be retrained with the clean training data set
together with some of the adversarial sets Sh, h 6= j. The authors argue that all the networks cannot
be fooled at the same time for a given adversarial example and this leads to a low(er) attacker’s
success rate. The final outputted class label is the predicted label of one of the networks chosen at
random among all networks; this gives high clean accuracy.
With respect to white-box attacks, the defense in Srisakaokul et al. [2018] seems not secure: For
verifying resistance against white-box attacks, Srisakaokul et al. [2018], only attacks each model
separately instead of attacking all the models at the same time as is done in Ensemble Pattern Attacks
in Section 4 in Xie et al. [2018]. Hence, the authors should do the Ensemble Pattern Attack on their
defense to have a completed claim on white-box resistance.
For testing resistance against Papernot’s black-box attack, the authors only work with an initial set
of 150 samples and 5 runs. This gives an augmented set of only 24 · 150 = 2400 samples used for
building the synthetic model (compared to an augmented set of 25 · 50K samples in our experiments).
Hence, the performance of synthetic model g is very poor and as a result a lower attacker’s success
rate. Nevertheless, even with a poor synthetic network (that is, very weak black-box adversary) the
reported success rate of the Papernot’s attack with FGSM is still high, i.e., around 18%/27% for
MNIST and CIFAR-10 (see Table 5 in Srisakaokul et al. [2018]. We performed experiments for our
strong mixed black-box adversary and found an attacker’s success rate of 63% for the best attack on
the best defense (Mul-Def 4 (MD4) Network in Table 8).
We summarize the attacker’s success rate of the black-box attacks on the aforementioned defenses in
Table 1. We can see that all defenses do not want to sacrifice clean accuracy p – generally at most a
drop of about 5%, see Meng and Chen [2017], with a larger drop of 13% in Xie et al. [2018]. As a
result of aiming at keeping the clean accuracy the same, the attacker’s success rate α remains very
high, typically α ≥ 0.50 for experiments with Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10 as in this paper.
These high attacker’s success rates give a drop in the effective clean accuracy of δ = p− (p− γ)(1−
α) ≥ p− p(1− 0.5) = 0.5p; the δ values are listed in the table.
For ImageNet, not studied in our paper, we have δ equal to 0.211 in Tramèr et al. [2017] and 0.396 in
Kurakin et al. [2016], albeit for the weaker pure black-box adversary (without access to the entire
training data set). First, for the stronger adversary analysed in this paper we expect these δ values to
become higher. Second, since Tramèr et al. [2017] has (compared to δ = 0.247 for BUZz) a higher
δ = 0.29 for the stronger adversary for CIFAR-10, we expect to also see this reflected in a smaller δ
for ImageNet for BUZz compared to Tramèr et al. [2017] (after fine tuning image transformations).
We leave exact experiments for future work. Third, even if BUZz would do similar when comparing
δ to Tramèr et al. [2017] for ImageNet, BUZz would still be the better choice: This is because even
though the δ values are the same, the attack success rate for BUZz is expected to be 7-10%, much
less than 27% of Tramèr et al. [2017] for the weaker adversary. This means that there is much less
adversarial control in BUZz compared to Tramèr et al. [2017].
Table 1: Attacker’s success rate of black-box attacks for state-of-the-art defenses
Defense Data set Attack Att. success rate α Orig. Cl.Ac p Cl.Ac pd δ γ
Tramèr et al. [2017] ImageNet Pure BB -FGSM ≈ 27% Tramèr et al. [2017] 78% (ImageNet) 78% (ImageNet) 0.211 0.0
Kurakin et al. [2016] ImageNet Pure BB- FGSM ≥ 50% Kurakin et al. [2016] 79%(ImageNet) 78% (ImageNet) 0.396 0.01
Tramèr et al. [2017] CIFAR-10 Mixed BB -MIM 55% (this paper) 93% (CIFAR-10) 86% (CIFAR-10) 0.54 0.07
Guo et al. [2017] CIFAR-10 Mixed BB - MIM 56% (this paper) 93% (CIFAR-10) 90% (CIFAR-10) 0.53 0.03
Cao and Gong [2017], Cohen et al. [2019] CIFAR-10 Mixed BB - MIM 61% (this paper) 93% (CIFAR-10) 92% (CIFAR-10) 0.57 0.01
Srisakaokul et al. [2018] CIFAR-10 Mixed BB - MIM 63% (this paper) 93% (CIFAR-10) 88% (CIFAR-10) 0.60 0.05
Feinman et al. [2017] CIFAR-10 Pure BB - C&W ≥ 80% Carlini and Wagner [2017a] 83% (CIFAR-10) 83% (CIFAR-10) 0.661 0.0
Xie et al. [2018] CIFAR-10 Mixed BB - MIM 73% (this paper) 93% (CIFAR-10) 82% (CIFAR-10) 0.72 0.11
Meng and Chen [2017] MNIST & CIFAR-10 Pure BB - C&W ≥ 99% Carlini and Wagner [2017b] 91% (CIFAR-10) 87% (CIFAR-10) 0.897 0.04
Papernot et al. [2016a] MNIST Oracle BB - FGSM 70% Papernot et al. [2017] 99% (MNIST) 98% (MNIST) 0.701 0.01
Metzen et al. [2017] MNIST Pure BB - C&W ≥ 84% Carlini and Wagner [2017b] 92% (MNIST) 92% (MNIST) 0.769 0.0
C Pseudo algorithms: Black-box attack & BUZz
Synthetic network. Algorithm 1 depicts the construction of a synthetic network g for the oracle
based black-box attack from Papernot et al. [2017]. The attacker uses as input an oracle O which
represents black-box access to the target model f which only returns the final class label F (f(x)) for
a query x (and not the score vector f(x)). Initially, the attacker has (part of) the training data set X ,
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i.e., he knows D = {(x, F (f(x))) : x ∈ X0} for some X0 ⊆ X . Notice that for a single iteration
N = 1, Algorithm 1 therefore reduces to an algorithm which does not need any oracle access to
O; this reduced algorithm is the one used in the pure black-box attack Carlini and Wagner [2017b],
Athalye et al. [2018a], Liu et al. [2017]. In this paper we assume the strongest black-box adversary in
Algorithm 1 with access to the entire training data set X0 = X (notice that this excludes test data for
evaluating the attack success rate).
In order to construct a synthetic network the attacker chooses a-priori a substitute architecture G for
which the synthetic model parameters θg need to be trained. The attacker uses known image-label
pairs in D to train θg using a training method M (e.g., Adam Kingma and Ba [2014]). In each
iteration the known data is doubled using the following data augmentation technique: For each image
x in the current data set D, black-box access to the target model gives label l = O(x). The Jacobian
of the synthetic network score vector g with respect to its parameters θg is evaluated/computed for
image x. The signs of the column in the Jacobian matrix that correspond to class label l are multiplied
with a (small) constant λ – this constitutes a vector which is added to x. This gives one new image
for each x and this leads to a doubling of D. After N iterations the algorithm outputs the trained
parameters θg for the final augmented data set D.
Algorithm 1 Construction of synthetic network g in Papernot’s oracle based black-box attack
1: Input:
2: O represents black-box access to F (f(·)) for target model f with output function F ;
3: X0 ⊆ X , where X is the training data set of target model f ;
4: substitute architecture G
5: training method M;
6: constant λ;
7: number N of synthetic training epochs
8: Output:
9: synthetic model g defined by parameters θg
10: (g also has output function F which selects the max confidence score;
11: g fits architecture G)
12:
13: Algorithm:
14: for N iterations do
15: D ← {(x,O(x)) : x ∈ Xt}
16: θg = M(G,D)
17: Xt+1 ← {x+ λ · sgn(Jθg (x)[O(x)]) : x ∈ Xt} ∪ Xt
18: end for
19: Output θg
The precise set-up for our experiments is given in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Table 2 details the used training
method M in Algorithm 1. For the evaluated data sets Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 without data
augmentation, we enumerate in Table 3 the amount |X0| of training data together with parameters λ
and N in Algorithm 1 (λ = 0.1 and N = 6 are taken from the oracle based black-box attack paper of
Papernot et al. [2017]; notice that a test data set of size 10.000 is standard practice; all remaining data
serves training and this is entirely accessible by the attacker).
Table 4 depicts the architecture G of the CNN network of the synthetic network g for the different
data sets; the structure has several layers (not to be confused with ’protection layer’ in BUZz which
is an image transformation together with a whole CNN in itself). The adversary attempts to attack
BUZz and will first learn a synthetic network g with architecture G (used as input in Algorithm 1
that corresponds to Table 4. Notice that the image transformations are kept secret and for this reason
the attacker can at best train a synthetic vanilla network. Of course the attacker does know the set
from which the image transformations in BUZz are taken and can potentially try to learn a synthetic
CNN for each possible image transformation and do some majority vote (like BUZz) on the outputted
labels generated by these CNNs. However, there are exponentially many transformations making
such an attack infeasible. For future research we will investigate whether a small sized subset of
’representative’ image transformations can be used to generate a synthetic model which can be used
to attack BUZz in a more effective way. Nevertheless, we believe that BUZz will remain secure
because of the security argument given in Section 4 where is shown how a single perturbation η leads
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to very different perturbations at each protected layer in BUZz. This leads to ’wide’ buffer zones and
their mere existence is enough to achieve our security goal – security is not derived from keeping
the image transformations private. Keeping these transformations private just makes it harder for the
adversary to construct a more effective attack but the resulting attack is expected to still have small
attacker’s success rates. We leave this study for future work.
Table 2: Training parameters used in the experiments
Training Parameter Value
Optimization Method ADAM
Learning Rate 0.0001
Batch Size 64
Epochs 100
Data Augmentation None
Table 3: Mixed black-box attack parameters
|X0| N λ
CIFAR-10 50000 4 0.1
Fashion-MNIST 60000 4 0.1
Table 4: Architectures of synthetic neural networks g from Carlini and Wagner [2017a]
Layer Type Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10
Convolution + ReLU 3 × 3 × 64
Convolution + ReLU 3 × 3 × 64
Max Pooling 2 × 2
Convolution + ReLU 3 × 3 × 128
Convolution + ReLU 3 × 3 × 128
Max Pooling 2 × 2
Fully Connected + ReLU 256
Fully Connected + ReLU 256
Softmax 10
White-box attack on the synthetic network. We perform the white-box attacks as described in
Section 2 such as FGSM Goodfellow et al. [2015], BIM Kurakin et al. [2017], MIM Dong et al.
[2018], PGD Madry et al. [2018], Carlini&WagnerCarlini and Wagner [2017a] and EAD Chen et al.
[2018] attacks on synthetic model in the mixed black box attacks. The reader can find the description
of the attacks in Appendix B.1.
When a certain white-box attack is used as a pure black-box attack, then no oracle access is available
and comparison l′ = O(x) is replaced by comparison l′ = F (g(x)), which uses the synthetic
network.
The parameters of the white-box attacks used in our paper can be found in the following table 5.
Table 5: Attacks’ parameters. i - number of iterations, d - decaying factor, r radius of the ball for
generating the initial noise, c - constant value of C&W attack,  - noise magnitude, β - constant value
of EAD attack. Binary Search = Bi.Sr
Attacks Fashion-MNIST CIFAR-10
FGSM  = 0.15  = 0.05
BIM i = 10,  = 0.015 i = 10,  = 0.005
PGD i = 10, r = 0.031,  = 0.015 i = 10, r = 0.031,  = 0.005
MIM i = 10, d = 1.0,  = 0.015 i = 10, d = 1.0,  = 0.005
C&W i = 1000, c = Bi.Sr i = 1000, c = Bi.Sr
EAD i = 1000, c = Bi.Sr, β = 0.01 i = 1000, c = Bi.Sr, β = 0.01
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Success rate black-box attack. In order to implement the black-box attack we first run Algorithm 1
which outputs the parameters of a synthetic network g. Next, out of the test data (each data set has
10.000 samples in our set-up) we select the first 1000 samples (x, l) which the target model f (i.e.,
BUZz in this paper) correctly classifies. For each of the 1000 samples we run a certain white-box
attack to produce 1000 adversarial examples. The attacker’s success rate is the fraction of adversarial
examples which change l to the desired new randomly selected l′ in a targeted attack or any other
label l′ 6= ⊥ for an untargeted attack.
Image transformations for BUZz. In the BUZz, we use image transformations that are composed
of a resizing operation i(x) and a linear transformation c(x) = Ax + b. An input image x at a
protected layer in BUZz is linearly transformed into an image i(c(x)) before it enters the correspond-
ing CNN network with ResNet architecture for CIFAR-10 and for Fashion-MNIST. In a network
implementation one can think of i(c(x)) as an extra layer in the CNN architecture of ResNet itself.
For the resize operations i(·) used in each of the protected layers in BUZz, we choose sizes that
are larger than the original dimensions of the image data. We do this to prevent loss of information
in the images that down sizing would create (and this would hurt the clean accuracy of BUZz).
In our experiments we use BUZz with 2, 4, and 8 protected layers. Each protected layer gets
its own resize operation i(·). When using 8 protected layers, we use image resizing operations
from 32 to 32, 40, 48, 64, 72, 80, 96, 104. Each protected layer will be differentiated from
each other protected layer due to the difference in how much resizing each layer implements.
This will lead to less transferability between the protected layers and as a result we expect to
see a wider buffer zone which diminishes the attacker’s success rate. When using 4 protected
layers, we use a copy of the 4 protected layers from BUZz with 8 networks that correspond to
the image resizing operations from 32 to 32, 48, 72, 96. When using 2 protected layers, we use a
copy of the 2 protected layers from BUZz with 8 networks that correspond to the image resizing
operations from 32 to 32 and 104. In our implementation we use resizing operation from github
https://github.com/cihangxie/NIPS2017_adv_challenge_defense Xie et al. [2018].
For each protected layer, the linear transformation c(x) = Ax+ b is randomly chosen from some
statistical distribution (the distribution is public knowledge and therefore known by the adversary).
Design of the statistical distribution depends on the complexity of the considered data set (in our case
we experiment with Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10). Transformation c(x) takes an image of size
n1 × n2×3 as input and considers this as a vector of length k = n1n2n3. Here, n1 and n2 denote
the horizontal and vertical width in pixels of image x; n3 = 3 means that each pixel has a red, blue,
and green values; n3 = 1 means that each pixel only has one black/white value. CIFAR-10 has
32 × 32 × 3 images and Fashion-MNIST has 28 × 28 × 1 images. All the values in vector x are
converted from integers [0..255] to the range [−0.5,+0.5] of real numbers. Notice that the entries of
c(x) may have their values outside of this range.
In our implementation we do not consider x to be in vector representation; we think of x as n3 times
a n1 × n2 matrix. For example, x = (X1, X2, X3) for n3 = 1. We restrict c(x) = Ax+ b to linear
operations
c(X1, X2, X3) = (X1A1 + b1, X2A2 + b2, X3A3 + b3),
where Ai are n2 × n2 matrices and bi are n1 × n2 matrices.
For CIFAR-10 we take matrices Ai to be identity matrices (this also makes A the identity matrix in
the vector representation of c(x)) and we use the same matrix b for each of the matrices bi, i.e.,
b′ = b1 = b2 = b3.
This means that we use the same random offset in the red, blue, and green values of a pixel. The
reason for making this design decision is because for CIFAR-10 we found that fully random A creates
large drops in clean accuracy, even when the network is trained to learn such distortions. As a result,
for data sets with high spatial complexity like CIFAR-10, we do not select A randomly. We choose A
to be the identity matrix. Likewise for b′ we only randomly generate 35% of the matrix values and
leave the rest as 0. For the randomly generated values, we choose them from a uniform distribution
from −0.5 to 0.5.
For datasets with less spatial complexity like Fashion-MNIST, we equate matrices A′ = A1 = A2 =
A3 and b′ = b1 = b2 = b3 and select A′ and b′ as random matrices: The values of A′ and b′ are
selected from a Gaussian distribution with µ = 0 and σ = 0.1.
22
D Experimental results
D.1 Buffer zone graphs
In Figure 2 we show buffer zone graphs for various defenses. These graphs are based on the the
decision region graphs originally presented in Liu et al. [2017]. In our graphs, each point on the
2D grid corresponds to the class label of an image I ′. Green represents that I ′ has been classified
correctly, while red and blue regions represent incorrect class labels. Gray represents that the null
(adversarial) class label has been assigned. The image I ′ is generated from the original image I using
the following equation: I ′ = I + x · g+ y · r. Here g represents the gradient of the loss function with
respect to I . In the equation, r represents a normalized random matrix that is orthogonal to I (note g
is also normalized). The other variables, x and y represent the magnitude of each matrix which is
determined based on the coordinates in the 2D graph.
In essence the graph can be interpreted in the following sense: At the origin I ′ is equal to I . The
origin is the original image without adversarial perturbations or random noise added. As we move
along the x-axis in the positive direction, the magnitude of the gradient matrix x increases. Moving
positively along only the x-axis is equivalent to the FGSM attack, where the image is modified by
adding the gradient of the loss function (with respect to the input). If we move along the y-axis only,
the magnitude of the random noise matrix y increases. This is equivalent to adding random noise to
the image. Moving along the positive x-axis and any direction in the y-axis means we are adding an
adversarial perturbation and a random noise to the original image I . The further from the origin, the
greater the magnitude of x and y and hence the larger the distortion that is applied to create I ′.
In the case where a defense uses multiple networks, each network j will have a different gradient
matrix gj . To compensate for this, we average the individual gj matrices together before normalizing
to get g. It is important to note that while the graphs shown in Figure 2 give experimental proof of
the concept of buffer zones, they cannot be used to attack BUZz defenses in practice. When creating
the graphs, we have knowledge of the individual gradient matrices gj for each individual network j.
This information is not available or obtainable by an adversary in a black-box setting, to the best of
our knowledge.
D.2 Attacks
The hierarchy of black-box attacks we experiment with can be divided into two different types. The
first type is generation of the synthetic model using training data and synthetic data labeled by the
oracle Papernot et al. [2017] which we call the mixed black-box attack. The parameters for this
attack are given in Table 3. The second type of black-box attack we consider is the pure black-box
attack. In this attack the generation of the synthetic model is accomplished using the original training
dataset and original training labels. The parameters for this attack are given in Table 3. In both
black-box attacks after the synthetic model is generated, we can run any white-box attack on the
synthetic model to create adversarial samples to try and fool the defense. The white-box attacks we
consider are FGSM Goodfellow et al. [2015], BIM Kurakin et al. [2017], MIM Dong et al. [2018],
PGD Madry et al. [2018], Carlini&WagnerCarlini and Wagner [2017a] and EAD Chen et al. [2018].
The parameters for these attacks are given in Table 5.
D.3 Experimental analysis
In Table 6 we show the defense success rate 1− α for the pure black-box attack on CIFAR-10 and
Fashion-MNIST for various BUZz defenses. Here we do not test every defense as these experimental
results are only used to demonstrate two points. The first point is that the pure black-box attack is
always equal to or weaker than the mixed black-box attack if you compare these table results to those
in Table 7 and Table 8. The second important point is that the BUZz defense is able to mitigate this
type of attack. i.e. the defense accuracy of BUZz-8 is 88% or greater for all attacks.
In Table 7 we show the defense success rate 1−α for the mixed black-box attack on Fashion-MNIST
for various BUZz defense configurations and a vanilla (no defense) network. In this table we also
show the clean accuracy and δ metric (the best δ is obtained by the BUZz-8 defense). We can interpret
Table 7 by Figure 4.
23
Figure 4: Fashion-MNIST defenses with clean accuracy pd (Clean Accuracy) and δ value (Delta) for
untargeted attacks.
In Table 8, for CIFAR-10 we show the clean accuracy pd and defense success rate 1− α for various
attacks. We also compute δ and the drop in accuracy γ for some defenses such as BUZz 2, 4,
8, BUZz using threshold cutoff 0.7, 0.95 and 0.99, the combination BT2-70, and plain classifier
(Vanilla), Xie’s: Randomized 1-Net Xie et al. [2018], Liu’s: Mixed Arch 2-Net Liu et al. [2017],
Cao’s: randomized smooth technique Cao and Gong [2017], Cohen et al. [2019], Guo’s: this is BUZz
with a single network Guo et al. [2017], Tramer’s: adversarial training Tramèr et al. [2017], MD2
and MD4 Srisakaokul et al. [2018]. In Table 8 the δ value is computed based on the attack success
rate of the most successful attack – the targeted and untargeted, mixed black box attack with MIM.
For example, to compute the δ for the vanilla case, we see that the untargeted MIM attack is the
most efficient one with attack success rate α of 0.72 (=1-0.28), p = 0.93 and pd = p = 0.93, thus
δ = 0.93 − 0.93 × 0.28 = 0.66 and γ = p − pd = 0. For BUZz2, since p = 0.93, pd = 0.85 and
1− α = 0.68, δ = 0.93− 0.85× 0.68 = 0.36 and γ = 0.93− 0.85 = 0.07.
For our BUZz defense, one run is implemented by first choosing matrices A′ and B′ from the
distribution corresponding to the considered data set for each protected network. Next the attacker’s
success rate and clean accuracy of the defense are simulated. For each next run, matrices A′ and B′
are again chosen anew. In Table 8, we report the result of the best case of the attack (which is the
worst case for the defender) among 5 runs. Indeed, all the attack results are not much different, i.e.,
they are only different in 1%. This shows that BUZz is not sensitive to the choice of A′ and B′ (worst
and best cases are close to one another).
We can interpret Table 8 by Figures 1 and 5 for untargeted and targeted attacks. We see that for the
broader class of untargeted attacks BUZz offers a significantly better defense when compared to our
selection of most prominent defenses in literature. On the other hand we see that for targeted attacks
having no defense at all (the vanilla scheme) is almost as good as the best defenses given by Cao &
Cong and BUZz strategy BT70.
For targeted attacks we have two remarks: First, in a targeted attack adversarial noise must already
bridge other non-targeted labeled regions in a vanilla scheme and as such it already behaves like a
BUZz scheme. This explains why implementing no attack at all for targeted attacks behaves like our
BUZz scheme. Second, among the vanilla scheme and the other best defenses the δ value and clean
accuracy pd are approximately the same. Among these defenses, we can now choose which attack
accuracy α is preferred. In this case the vanilla scheme has a defense success rate 1 − α = 0.81,
while BUZz’s BT70 and Cao & Cong have 1− α = 0.84 and 0.85 close to one another.
The results for the mixed black-box attacks on Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10 are presented in
Table 7 and Table 8. Overall we can see that the different BUZz configurations offer better defense
accuracy than the existing literature defenses. Specifically, if we consider BUZz-8, the attack success
rate drops to 7% for the strongest black-box adversary on CIFAR-10 and to 11% for Fashion-MNIST.
However, this security comes with a drop in clean accuracy to 76% for CIFAR-10 and 77% for
Fashion-MNIST. Alternatively, other BUZz defenses can be chosen if a higher clean accuracy is
desired. For example, using BUZz with a threshold cutoff of 0.7 for CIFAR-10 gives a defense
success rate of 52% and a clean accuracy of 90%.
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Figure 5: CIFAR-10 defenses with clean accuracy pd (Clean Accuracy) and δ value (Delta) for
targeted attacks.
D.4 Discussion
From the experiments on Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10, we see the success of untargeted mixed
black-box attacks on vanilla nets is significantly higher than that of the targeted attacks.
From the view of the designer, she/he should pay attention to the highest threat or the most powerful
attack, in this case untargeted mixed black-box attacks. In other words, we should use the δ of
untargeted mixed black-box attacks as a true measurement to evaluate the resistance of a given
defense. Equipped with this argument, we can now see that BUZz has very good resistance to
adversarial examples at the cost of clean accuracy. As we argued in Table 1, current-state-of-the-art
defenses generally have very large δ which is due to poor resistance against adversarial examples
– this is because their clean accuracy is nearly equal to that of the vanilla network (these defenses
do not want to give up some of the clean accuracy). A good lesson we can learn from Table 1 is
that we have to sacrifice something (here, clean accuracy) to gain security. If the defense does not
have ‘buffer zones’, then the adversary always wins the game in that it is possible to produce with
significant probability adversarial examples with small noise to bypass the defense. Including ‘buffer
zones’ means the designer has to give up some clean accuracy.
For Fashion-MNIST, we may want to use 8-network BUZz because it has the best trade-off between
defense rate (one minus the attacker’s succes rate) and the defense accuracy (the clean accuracy of
the defense). Similarly, for CIFAR-10 we suggest 4-network BUZz.
In this paper the main strength of BUZz is two-fold. First, we provide the highest defense accuracy
(as compared to other defenses in the literature) with the defense configuration BUZz-8. Second, we
offer the user a spectrum of choices. We do not claim any one BUZz defense is superior but let the
user choose the defense based on their own values (whether they prioritize defense accuracy or clean
accuracy pd).
Table 6: Targeted (Tar.) and Untargeted (Untar.) pure black-box attacks on BUZz 2, 4, 8 defenses for
Fashion-MNIST and CIFAR-10. Clean prediction accuracy pd - Cl.Ac pd, Drop in clean prediction
accuracy γ.
Fashion-MNIST CIFAR-10
Attack/Type Vanilla BUZz2 BUZz4 BUZz8 Vanilla BUZz2 BUZz4 BUZz8
FGSM/Tar. 0.87 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.90 0.94 0.97 0.99
FGSM/Untar. 0.43 0.75 0.82 0.88 0.44 0.75 0.87 0.94
BIM/Tar. 0.89 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.96 0.99 0.99
BIM/Untar. 0.36 0.82 0.88 0.93 0.45 0.73 0.86 0.93
PGD/Tar. 0.88 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.97 0.99 0.99
PGD/Untar. 0.37 0.83 0.87 0.92 0.45 0.75 0.85 0.93
MIM/Tar. 0.82 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.85 0.93 0.97 0.99
MIM/Untar. 0.35 0.78 0.85 0.90 0.38 0.70 0.84 0.90
C&W/Tar. 0.99 0.99 1.0 1.0 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.0
C&W/Untar. 0.91 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.92 0.96 0.98 1.0
EAD/Tar. 0.99 0.99 1.0 1.0 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.0
EAD/Untar. 0.90 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.92 0.96 0.98 1.0
Cl.Ac pd 0.94 0.85 0.83 0.77 0.93 0.85 0.81 0.76
δ 0.62 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.58 0.34 0.25 0.25
Dp.Ac γ 0.0 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.0 0.09 0.13 0.19
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Table 7: Targeted (Tar.) and Untargeted (Untar.) mixed black-box attacks on BUZz 2, 4, 8, BUZz has
only one single classifier with threshold 0.70 (BT70), 0.95 (BT95) and 0.99 (BT99), BUZz2 having
one classifier with threshold 0.95 (BT2-95) defenses for Fashion-MNIST. Clean prediction accuracy
pd - Cl.Ac pd, Drop in clean prediction accuracy γ.
Attack/Type Vanilla BUZz2 BUZz4 BUZz8 BT70 BT95 BT99 BT2-95
FGSM/Tar. 0.67 0.93 0.97 0.98 0.76 0.85 0.94 0.97
FGSM/Untar. 0.17 0.67 0.80 0.89 0.35 0.57 0.72 0.85
BIM/Tar. 0.50 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.60 0.77 0.89 0.99
BIM/Untar. 0.11 0.74 0.85 0.94 0.17 0.30 0.50 0.89
PGD/Tar. 0.50 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.59 0.79 0.89 0.99
PGD/Untar. 0.10 0.74 0.85 0.95 0.18 0.30 0.50 0.89
MIM/Tar. 0.43 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.52 0.72 0.86 0.97
MIM/Untar. 0.10 0.71 0.82 0.92 0.18 0.34 0.52 0.86
C&W/Tar. 0.97 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.99 1.0 1.0 1.0
C&W/Untar. 0.95 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.97 1.0 1.0 1.0
EAD/Tar. 0.98 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.99 1.0 1.0 1.0
EAD/Untar. 0.93 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.95 1.0 1.0 1.0
Cl.Ac pd 0.94 0.85 0.83 0.77 0.92 0.90 0.85 0.78
δ untar. 0.85 0.38 0.30 0.26 0.78 0.67 0.5 0.26
Dp.Ac γ 0.0 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.15
Table 8: Targeted (Tar.) and Untargeted (Un.) mixed black-box attacks on common defenses for
CIFAR-10. BUZz 2, 4, 8, and BUZz has only one single classifier with threshold 0.7 (BT70), 0.95
(BT95) and 0.99 (BT99), BUZz2 having one classifier with threshold 0.70 (BT2-70), Vanilla: the
plain target model, Xie’s: Randomized 1-Net Xie et al. [2018], Liu’s: Mixed Arch 2-Net Liu et al.
[2017], Cao’s: randomized smooth function Cao and Gong [2017], Cohen et al. [2019], Guo’s: this is
BUZz with a single network Guo et al. [2017], Tramer’s: adversarial training Tramèr et al. [2017],
MD2 and MD4 Srisakaokul et al. [2018]. Clean prediction accuracy pd - Cl.Ac pd, Drop in clean
prediction accuracy γ.
Defense Tar.
FGSM
Tar.
BIM
Tar.
PGD
Tar.
MIM
Tar.
C&W
Tar.
EAD
Cl.Ac
pd
δ Dp.Ac
γ
Vanilla 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.81 0.99 0.99 0.93 0.18 0.0
BUZz2 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.90 1.0 1.0 0.85 0.16 0.07
BUZz4 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.95 1.0 1.0 0.81 0.16 0.12
BUZz8 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.97 1.0 1.0 0.76 0.19 0.17
BT70 0.91 0.89 0.89 0.84 0.99 0.99 0.90 0.17 0.03
BT95 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.93 1.0 1.0 0.85 0.14 0.07
BT99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 1.0 1.0 0.79 0.16 0.14
BT2-70 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.94 1.0 1.0 0.82 0.16 0.11
Xie’s 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.75 0.98 0.97 0.82 0.32 0.11
Liu’s 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.88 1.0 1.0 0.85 0.18 0.07
Cao’s 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.85 0.99 0.99 0.92 0.15 0.01
Guo’s 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.83 0.99 0.99 0.90 0.18 0.03
Tramer’s 0.90 0.93 0.86 0.93 0.99 0.99 0.86 0.19 0.07
MD2 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.79 0.98 0.98 0.88 0.23 0.05
MD4 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.82 0.98 0.99 0.87 0.22 0.06
Defense Un.
FGSM
Un.
BIM
Un.
PGD
Un.
MIM
Un.
C&W
Un.
EAD
Cl.Ac
pd
δ Dp.Ac
γ
Vanilla 0.33 0.38 0.38 0.28 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.66 0.0
BUZz2 0.75 0.76 0.76 0.68 1.0 1.0 0.85 0.36 0.07
BUZz4 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.86 1.0 1.0 0.81 0.23 0.12
BUZz8 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 1.0 1.0 0.76 0.22 0.17
BT70 0.55 0.59 0.59 0.52 0.99 0.99 0.90 0.46 0.03
BT95 0.80 0.81 0.82 0.77 1.0 1.0 0.85 0.27 0.07
BT99 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.89 1.0 1.0 0.79 0.22 0.14
BT2-70 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.80 1.0 1.0 0.82 0.27 0.11
Xie’s 0.36 0.41 0.39 0.27 0.88 0.88 0.82 0.70 0.11
Liu’s 0.73 0.70 0.70 0.63 0.99 0.99 0.85 0.39 0.07
Cao’s 0.42 0.48 0.48 0.39 0.98 0.98 0.92 0.57 0.01
Guo’s 0.48 0.57 0.56 0.44 0.99 0.98 0.90 0.53 0.03
Tramer’s 0.55 0.63 0.45 0.64 0.99 0.97 0.86 0.54 0.07
MD2 0.44 0.50 0.49 0.37 0.94 0.93 0.88 0.60 0.05
MD4 0.49 0.53 0.54 0.37 0.93 0.92 0.87 0.60 0.06
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